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Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in
1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
program at the University of South Carolina. His initial
assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979, fol-
lowing a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for Com-
mander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an
Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the
Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds mas-
ter’s degrees in public administration (finance) from
Harvard and in national security and strategic studies
from the Naval War College, where he graduated with
highest distinction.
After completing department head tours in USS Deyo
(DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he com-
manded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washing-
ton included assignments to the staff of the Chief of
Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and per-
sonal aide to the Secretary.
Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to com-
mand USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed
command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998,
deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet oper-
ating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the
USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the
Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.
Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he di-
rected the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Fol-
lowing this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy
Division as chief of staff of the Navy’s Roles and Mis-
sions Organization. He finished his most recent Pentagon
tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure, Re-
sources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint Staff—
primarily in the theater air and missile defense mission
area. His most recent Washington assignment was to
the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of Senate
Liaison.
In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Com-
mander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution. Rear
Admiral Shuford assumed command of the Abraham
Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in August 2003. He be-
came the fifty-first President of the Naval War College
on 12 August 2004.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
AS MOST OF YOU ARE WELL AWARE, for over a century the College has
played a unique role in the analysis and formulation of national
maritime strategy and policy as well as national grand strategy. Over the past
two years, the Naval War College has found itself once again in a key position to
support the leadership of our maritime forces, and of those of our global part-
ners, in thinking through the implications of a new set of global security chal-
lenges and opportunities (see the “President’s Forum” in the Autumn 2006 issue
of the Review). The current effort finds its roots in the discussions of the 17th In-
ternational Seapower Symposium (ISS), held in the fall of 2005.
At that conference, fifty-five chiefs of navies and coast guards, along with
twenty-seven war college presidents from around the world, gathered in New-
port to share perspectives on a broad range of issues important to our navies,
coast guards, and countries through the mechanism of regionally oriented semi-
nars (eight of them). The two days produced from each region comprehensive
lists of key concerns, the similarity of which was remarkable. As the symposium
drew to a close, a consensus was articulated that maritime security was funda-
mental to address these concerns, that the scope of security challenges reached
beyond the waters of individual nations, and most importantly, that responsibil-
ity for the maritime domain—the great “commons” of the world—was shared.
Moreover, the need was expressed for regional and global mechanisms that
would allow maritime nations to bring more routinely and effectively their par-
ticular capabilities together to ensure a free and secure maritime domain.
The host of that ISS, Admiral Mike Mullen, summarized the key proposition
of the symposium: “Because today’s challenges are global in nature, we must be
collective in our response. We are bound together in our dependence on the seas
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and in our need for security for the vast commons. This is a requisite for national
security, global stability, and economic prosperity.” Acknowledging that “the
United States Navy cannot, by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the en-
tire maritime domain,” Admiral Mullen said that “it must count on assistance
from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and
precluding its use by others that threaten national, regional, or global security.”
So too must each nation count on contributions from other nations.
Then began a very productive period, when the College—aligned with the
fundamental notions of the 17th International Seapower Symposium—was
tasked to work on a new maritime strategy “of and for its time.” Critical to our ef-
fort to rethink maritime strategy has been an extensive scenario analysis and
war-gaming effort and a series of high-level conferences, symposia, and other
professional exchanges with maritime partners here in Newport and other ven-
ues around the world. This collaborative effort has produced great insight and
has brought into focus the diverse perspectives necessary to make this strategy
robust across multiple challenges and useful both for Navy leadership and na-
tional policy makers in understanding the key role maritime forces must play in
the evolving international system.
We see some powerful ideas in this strategy: the preeminent value of mari-
time forces to underwrite stability for the global system, and an emphasis on the
unique capabilities inherent in maritime forces to prevent global shocks and to
limit and localize regional conflict. Over and above the long-standing naval
commitment to provide high-end military capability, there are clear new de-
mands related to sustaining the global system—demands that are peculiar to the
maritime domain. The new maritime strategy also recognizes that we must rely
increasingly, across the range of military operations, on an expanded set of more
robust, global maritime relationships—in effect, partnerships that engender
trust, contribute to war prevention, and yield more effective maritime security.
At the 18th International Seapower Symposium, hosted here at the College in
October 2007, General James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Ad-
miral Thad Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard; and Admiral Gary
Roughead, our new Chief of Naval Operations, presented before the largest
gathering of high-ranking naval leadership ever assembled in the world the re-
sults of the work of the last two years. Present in Spruance Auditorium were
sixty-nine chiefs of naval operations, twenty-one commandants of coast guards,
sixteen war college presidents, and many senior uniformed and civilian leaders
from the United States. (I should note that nearly a quarter of our foreign guests
were graduates of the College!) In all, ninety-eight countries were represented,
and the event—with the three service chiefs presiding—was televised to the na-
tional security press corps in the Pentagon.
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The strategy they presented (printed in its entirety in this issue) provides a
long-needed, overarching logic that links the vital contribution of the nation’s
maritime services to global security and prosperity.
This has truly been an international collaborative effort. Many, if not most, of
the navies represented at the 2007 ISS were engaged in some fashion during the
strategy’s development, and its substance and wording were significantly influ-
enced by these discussions and inputs. If the initial reception by the heads of na-
vies in attendance is any indication, the new strategy will provide a sound basis for
achieving the vision of global maritime cooperation on an unprecedented scale.
The new strategy also reflects the extensive collaboration with the Navy’s
maritime service partners. The three sea services have worked on the strategy as
an integrated team from the very first. All three service chiefs have signed the
document; it truly represents a national maritime strategy. This collaboration
also extended to the staffs of our joint combatant commanders and the U.S. in-
teragency arena.
The strategy’s rollout at Newport underscores the unique role the College
plays in enabling genuine collaboration among the other sea services, interna-
tional navies, and a host of other organizations. In fact, it was the formation of
new relationships and the strengthening of existing ones that compelled the de-
velopment of the new strategy. On the basis of the open sharing of information
and of respect for the perspectives and ideas of all, the College was able to inte-
grate the thinking of a wide range of people who would not ordinarily have an
opportunity to exchange views. This synthesis of diverse perspectives embodies
the philosophy behind the strategy itself, so in a sense the development of the
strategy was also a step in its execution.
As I have outlined, this has been a very different kind of strategy development
process. In the words of Paul Bracken, “It represents a break with recent U.S.
strategic thinking in that it did not start with the answer.”* I am not saying that
we started with a completely blank sheet of paper, but we did free ourselves from
preexisting biases on desired fleet size or shape. In fact, we all but banned any
discussion of ships, submarines, or aircraft, focusing instead on the relationship
between grand strategy and seapower. By maintaining that discipline through-
out the project, I think we achieved one of the going-in goals—that is, to elevate
the discussion in order to create a broader definition of seapower. I anticipate
that A Cooperative Strategy will be an influential document for years to come.
Part of its influence will be due to the way we went about crafting it, giving it a
joint, interagency, and international pedigree, as well as solid intellectual under-
pinnings to make it robust and durable. From the very beginning we were intent
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 2 3
* Paul Bracken, “Maritime Strategy and Grand Strategy,” Chinfo News Clips, 29 September 2006.
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on taking the “long view,” to borrow from the title of Peter Schwartz’s book,*
and we applied Schwartz’s idea of a “strategic conversation” with a broad range
of expert stakeholders around the nation and the world.
Despite the strategy’s strong pedigree, I don’t think anyone would consider it
a finished product in the sense that we can now put it in a drawer and go on to
other things. Quite the contrary—if history is any guide, it will be a number of
years before the implications of the new strategy are completely understood. It
took several decades for us to sort out the program and resource implications of
War Plan ORANGE, and the 1980s Maritime Strategy was still being refined and
interpreted when the Soviet Union fell. Thus, I would expect that we will be dis-
cussing, analyzing, arguing, and gaming the new strategy for several years.
The College will have a significant role in all of these efforts, including in-
volvement in the Navy’s new Adaptive Planning Process, which seeks to establish
systematically a strategic “front end” for the requirements process in the Penta-
gon. Among other activities, the College will reenter the arena of “Title X” war
gaming, whereby services can examine, integrate, and evolve their future con-
cepts. The Naval War College was the originator of this type of game in the late
1970s, with its “Global” series. Whereas the Global games actually preceded and
informed the 1980s Maritime Strategy, this new maritime strategy will set in
motion a new series of strategy and concept games to translate the document ef-
fectively into operational, policy, and resource contexts.
I fully expect this national and international dialogue on strategy to continue,
building on the work of the last two years and the investment of honest and ex-
pert intellectual capital it represents.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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